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Targeting, the Law of War, and
the Uniform Code of Military
Justice
Michael W. Meier & James T. Hill*
ABSTRACT
Allegations of civilian deaths or injury or damage to civilian
property caused during combat operations require an
investigation to determine the facts, make recommendations
regarding lessons learned in order to prevent future occurrences,
and recommend whether individual soldiers should be held
accountable. Using the factual circumstances of the airstrike on
the Midecins Sans Frontidres hospital, this Article articulates
how, in the context of targeting, a violation of the Law of War is
made punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as
explained by the recent Targeting Supplement promulgated by
The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In ground operations, one of the most difficult tasks for soldiers
under the Law of Armed Conflict is targeting. In making a targeting
decision, parties to an armed conflict must conduct an attack in
accordance with the principles of distinction and proportionality, which
impose a duty to assess available information to deterinine whether a
particular attack would be lawful.' This is especially true when
conducting an attack in a populated area with civilians and civilian
objects in close proximity to the fighting, which often leads to
unintended civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. On the
night of October 2, 2015, that is exactly what happened in Kunduz,
Afghanistan, when an AC-130 gunship mistook a hospital operated by
M6decins Sans Frontibres (MSF), also known as Doctors Without
Borders, for a Taliban compound. During a thirty minute period, the
AC-130 gunship fired more than two hundred rounds at the hospital,
resulting in the tragic death of over thirty civilians and injuring an
additional thirty-seven others.2
Almost immediately after the attack, MSF, through its General
Director, Christopher Stokes, in addition to calling for an international
investigation, stated in pertinent part:
Not a single member of our staff reported any fighting inside the MSF hospital
compound prior to the US airstrike on Saturday morning. The hospital was full
of MSF staff, patients and their caretakers. It is 12 MSF staff members and ten
patients, including three children, who were killed in the attack. We reiterate
that the main hospital building, where medical personnel were caring for
patients, was repeatedly and very precisely hit during each aerial raid, while the
rest of the compound was left mostly untouched. We condemn this attack, which
constitutes a grave violation of International Humanitarian Law.3
1. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.4.2 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
2. U.S. FORCEs-AFGHANISTAN, INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE AIRSTRIKE ON
THE MEDECINS SANS FRONTItRES/DoCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS TRAUMA CENTER IN
KUNDUz, AFGHANISTAN ON 3 OCTOBER 2015 [hereinafter KUNDUZ INVESTIGATION
REPORT].
3. Statement on Kunduz Hospital Bombing, M9DECINS SANS FRONTItRES USA
(Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/statement-kunduz-hospital-
bombing [https://perma.cc/C69P-Y5YE] (archived Feb. 4, 2018) [hereinafter MSF Press
Release].
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MSF's outrage over the airstrike on the hospital is certainly
understandable. The airstrike was a horrible tragedy, but did it
amount to a "grave violation" as MSF alleged?
A Department of Defense investigation4 disagreed, asserting "this
tragic incident was caused by a combination of human errors,
compounded by the process and equipment failures" and the fact "that
the aircrew [was] 'unaware' . . . they were firing on a hospital."5 Yet,
the investigation did not cite to any authority that distinguished
"human errors" from a violation of the Law of War, nor did it
adequately address Mr. Stokes's assertion that the incident constituted
a "grave violation of International Humanitarian Law."6
When there is an allegation of civilian deaths or injury, or damage
to civilian property, caused during combat operations, commanders
must review or investigate those incidents. Such an investigation
requires the reviewing commanders to consider relevant and credible
information from all available sources, such as other agencies, partner
governments, and nongovernmental organizations, and to take
measures to mitigate the likelihood of future civilian casualties.7
When an Army Commander appoints such an investigation, it
must be conducted pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6,8 and the
investigating officer must determine the facts and make
recommendations regarding lessons learned in order to alleviate future
similar occurrences, as-well as determine whether individual soldiers
should be held accountable.9 In the case of the MSF incident, an officer
conducted an AR 15-6 investigation, and an Army Judge Advocate
completed a legal review and determined the Kunduz investigation
was in compliance with AR 15-6.1o
Although the investigation may have been conducted in
compliance with AR 15-6, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) of the
Army believed US Army investigative procedures should be improved
to address international law issues. In particular, TJAG was concerned
that 'legitimacy"-a principle of warfare for US joint operationsu-
4. KUNDUz INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 2.
5. Barbara Starr & Ryan Browne, Pentagon: U.S. bombing of Afghanistan
Hospital not a War Crime, CNN (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/
04/29/politics/u-s-airstrike-hospital-afghanistan-investigationlindex.html
[https://perma.cclKRW2-XD3W] (archived Feb. 4, 2018).
6 MSF Press Release, supra note 3.
7. Exec. Order No. 13732, 81 Fed. Reg. 44485 (July 7, 2016).
8. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY REG. 15-6, PROCEDURES FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS (Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter
AR 15-6].
9. Id. at § II.
10. KUNDUZ INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-9.
11. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS, at 1-2 fig. I-1
(2011) (asserting that "legitimacy" is a principle of war for joint operations, the other
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could be undermined if targeting investigations did not clearly
delineate between human error and international criminal violations,
including "grave breaches" of the Law of War.1 2 Yet the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), the criminal code that applies to all US
service members, does not specifically address these matters.1 3
Further, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which define "grave breaches"
of the Law of War, do not clearly articulate how a violation of Law of
War targeting requirements can amount to such a breach.14
On May 30, 2017, TJAG promulgated the Targeting and the Law
of War: Administrative Investigations and Criminal Law Supplement
(Targeting Supplement),15 which articulates the link between
targeting law, the UCMJ, and the pertinent 1949 Geneva
Conventions.16 The Targeting Supplement explains the analytical
framework for assessing compliance with the Law of War and is
intended, in the context of targeting, to assist Judge Advocates in
recognizing pertinent lines of investigative effort required to
thoroughly and impartially investigate suspected violations of both the
Law of War and the UCMJ. 17
TJAG references legitimacy as an underlying purpose of the
publication, stating, "[f]rom the perspective of our partners, allies, and
non-governmental organizations, the Law of War is the lens through
which they view U.S. adherence to the rule of law in the context of
targeting."1 8 Further, the Targeting Supplement also notes that
legitimacy has a domestic component, stating that "from a domestic
audience's perspective . . . adherence to the rule of law may be best
understood" by that audience "through the application of common law
concepts that underpin the UCMJ's punitive articles."19
are objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security,
surprise, simplicity, restraint and perseverance).
12. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter GC 1] (describing "grave" breaches of the Geneva Conventions); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and Ship-wrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter GC H]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 111]; Geneva
Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV] (defining "grave breaches").
13. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2016)
[hereinafter UCMJ].
14. See GC I, supra note 13.
15. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, TARGETING
AND THE LAW OF WAR: ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS & CRIMINAL LAW SUPPLEMENT
(May 20, 2017) [hereinafter TARGETING SUPPLEMENT].
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at i.
19. Id.
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Using the airstrike on the MSF hospital as the backdrop, this
Article articulates how, in the context of targeting, a violation of the
Law of War is made punishable under the UCMJ as explained by the
Targeting Supplement. Part II discusses the factual circumstances
surrounding the "human error" that led to the MSF incident. Part III
addresses how the Law of War distinguishes between such error and
international criminal violations of the Law of War. Part IV addresses
the Law of War duties the Targeting Supplement applies to targeting
and the required mens rea to establish a Law of War violation in the
context of those duties. Part V explains how the Targeting Supplement
distinguishes between violations of the Law of War and violations of
US domestic law and explains how a violation of the latter can result
in a violation of the former. Finally, Part VI explains how the Targeting
Supplement establishes the link between Law of War violations, the
common law-like crimes contained in the UCMJ's punitive articles, and
the "grave breaches"20 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
II. AIRSTRIKE ON THE MSF HOSPITAL
On September 28, 2015, after months of fighting, Taliban fighters
unexpectedly seized the northern Afghan provincial capital of Kunduz,
a city of approximately three hundred thousand residents.21 This
sudden seizure of Kunduz gave the Taliban a political and military
victory that had eluded them since 2001 and presented the Afghan
government with a demoralizing setback for the control of Afghanistan.
There were approximately five hundred Taliban fighters in the city,
while seven thousand government troops retreated to the airport.2 2
On September 30, 2015, Afghan forces, with support from US
Special Forces, began to try and regain control of Kunduz.23 Between
September 30 and October 2, Afghan and US forces established a small
base at an Afghan police compound and repelled several Taliban
attacks.24 During the evening of October 2, 2015, Afghan forces decided
to attack an insurgent-controlled target in the city.25 As part of their
planning, the Afghans requested air support from the Special Forces
20. See GC I, supra note 13 .
21. Joseph Goldstein & Mujib Mashal, Taliban Fighters Capture Kunduz City as
Afghan Forces Retreat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29
/world/asia/taliban-fighters-enter-city-of-kunduz-in-northern-afghanistan.html
[https:/perma.cclRH96-KP2X] (archived Feb. 4, 2018).
22. Id.
23. U.S. CENT. COMMAND, SUMMARY OF THE AIRSTRIKE ON THE MSF TRAUMA
CENTER IN KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OCTOBER 3,2015: INVESTIGATION AND FOLLOW-ON
ACTIONS (Apr. 28, 2016) [hereinafter U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY].
24. Id. at 2.
25 Id.
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elements supporting their efforts.26 An AC-130 gunship was directed
to provide the requested support and arrived near Kunduz in the early
morning on October 3, 2015.27
The aircrew attempted to locate the Taliban-controlled target site
from the grid coordinates provided by the Afghan forces that the US
Special Forces commander on the ground was relaying through the
Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). 2 8 The aircrew was still
unable to locate the target as the grid coordinates directed them to an
open field, so the aircrew attempted to visually identify the target
structure based on a description relayed from the Afghan forces
through the JTAC.2 9
The aircrew identified a structure that they believed to be the
intended Taliban-controlled target, but that structure was actually the
MSF Trauma Center.3 0 Before they engaged the target, one aircrew
member, the TV Sensor Operator, identified the correct structure as
also fitting the intended target. However, after several attempts to
clarify which structure was the intended target, the aircrew was again
redirected to the MSF hospital, as it generally matched the physical
description of the intended Taliban-controlled target, even though it
was approximately four hundred meters away.3 '
At approximately 2:08 a.m., the aircrew began firing on the MSF
hospital under the mistaken belief that it was the Taliban-controlled
compound.32 Around 2:19 a.m., MSF personnel contacted US
government personnel, notifying them that the MSF hospital was
receiving fire.3 3 Because of the fighting around Kunduz, it was not
initially clear who was engaging the MSF hospital.34 There were a
series of communications across multiple echelons of command, and
the US Special Forces commander on the ground realized that the AC-
130 was engaging the MSF hospital and not the intended Taliban-
controlled target.3 5 The airstrike was halted at approximately 2:38






31. Id. at 2-3.
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injuries.3 6 Since the investigation was completed, MSF has increased
the number of reported casualties to forty-two.3 7
US Army General John Campbell, then the Commander of US
Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), directed an investigation to
determine the cause of this incident. He appointed Army Major
General William Hickman as the investigating officer, who was
assisted by Air Force Brigadier General (BG) Robert Armfield and
Army BG Sean Jenkins.3 8 All three were brought in from outside
Afghanistan in order to provide an objective perspective. The
investigative team included over a dozen subject matter experts from
several specialty fields.3 9
The team visited the MSF Trauma Center site and several other
locations in the city of Kunduz, and they interviewed more than sixty-
five witnesses including personnel at the Trauma Center, members of
US and Afghan ground forces, members of the aircrew, and
representatives at every echelon of command in Afghanistan. The team
had full access to classified information, and the investigation included
more than three thousand pages of documentary evidence, much of it
classified.
The intended target was an insurgent-controlled site, which was
approximately four hundred meters away from the MSF hospital. The
investigation found that the AC-130 gunship aircrew, in support of a
US Special Forces element and Afghan ground forces, misidentified
and struck the MSF hospital. It further determined that neither the
aircrew nor the members of the ground forces were aware the aircrew
was firing on the hospital during the airstrike.40
The investigation determined the airstrike was caused by a
combination of human errors that were compounded by process and
equipment failures.4 1 Further, fatigue and high operational tempo by
those engaged in the airstrike contributed to the incident. These
factors contributed to the "fog of war," which is the uncertainty often
encountered during combat operations. The investigation found that
this combination of factors caused both the Ground Force Commander
and the air crew to believe mistakenly that the air crew was firing on
the Taliban-controlled target as opposed to the MSF hospital.42
36. Id. at 2; see Kunduz: Updated Death Toll - 42 People Killed in Kunduz
Hospital, MEDECINS SANS FRONTItERES (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.msf.org/enlarticle/
kunduz-updated-death-toll-%E2%80%93-42-people-killed-us-airstrikes-kunduz-
hospital [https://perma.cc/UU66-79GV] (archived Feb. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Updated
Death Toll].
37. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 2; see Updated Death
Toll, supra note 36.
38. KUNDUz INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
39. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2.
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The investigation concluded that certain personnel failed to
comply with the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Laws of War. The
investigation, however, did not conclude that these failures amounted
to a war crime. As a result of the investigation, sixteen US service
members received administrative punishment. However, it determined
that criminal proceedings were not appropriate in light of the fact that
the errors were unintentional and that there were other mitigating
factors, such as equipment failures, that affected the mission.43
General Campbell approved the investigation on November 21, 2015.44
III. ERRORS IN JUDGMENT AND THE LAW OF WAR
Had the service members involved in the incident been criminally
prosecuted for a Law of War violation, it is unlikely that the
prosecution would have been successful in light of the service members'
unintentional human error. The Nuremberg Tribunal case of United
States v. Rendulic illustrates this point.45 In Rendulic, the Nuremberg
Tribunal confronted one of the greatest operational errors in
international criminal tribunal history. Operating under the mistaken
belief that Russian forces were in pursuit, German General Lothar
Rendulic implemented a devastating "scorched earth" campaign in the
Norwegian province of Finmark.46 General Rendulic's forces leveled
entire villages across Finmark, blasted highways, wrecked
communication lines, and destroyed port installations.47 The tribunal
noted the devastation was "as complete as an efficient army could do"
and that, even years after the operation, the devastation throughout
Finmark was still "discernible to the eye."48 Nonetheless, the tribunal
concluded that General Rendulic "may have erred in the exercise of his
judgement but he was guilty of no criminal act."49
The operative principle that guided the tribunal's conclusion is
embodied in the phrase "erred in the exercise of his judgement."5 0 A
more complete version of the principle was articulated by the
Nuremberg Tribunal in the High Command Case, which stated an
accused "[c]annot be held criminally responsible for a mere error in
judgment as to disputable legal questions."si The U.S. Supreme Court
43. See id. at 3-4.
44. Id. at 1.
45. See U.S. GovT PRINTING OFFICE, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1288 (1950) [hereinafter 11 TRIALS OF WAR].
46. Id. at 1295-96.
47. Id. at 1296.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1297 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 511 (emphasis added);see alsoAshcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 U.S. 2074, 2085
(2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) ("Qualified immunity gives
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgements about
794 [VOL. 51:787
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adhered to the same principle in an early qualified immunity case,
Wilkes v. Dinsman, which stated a military official is protected from
liability for "mere errors of judgment in the discharge of his duties."
5 2
The US Manual for Courts-Martial also enshrines this principle in
Article 99 (misbehavior before the enemy) and Article 110 (improper
hazarding of a vessel), specifying that a "mere error in judgment" is not
punishable under those articles.53
Errors in judgment arise in the context of legal duties that leave
room for judgment-Rendulic's analysis illustrates the point. In
General Rendulic's case, the legal duty at issue was imposed by Article
23(g) of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), which
prohibits the destruction or seizure of "the enemy's property, unless
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war."54 As the language of Article 23(g) is imprecise, the
tribunal articulated the following standard that would guide their
analysis in assessing uilt or innocence: "If the facts were such as would
justify the action by the exercise of judgment, after giving consideration
to all the factors and existing possibilities, even though the conclusion
reached may have been faulty, it cannot be said to be criminal."5 5 Put
another way, an "error in judgment" can occur in the context of
discretionary duties, that is, mandatory legal obligations that leave
discretion for the "exercise of judgement."5 6 Discretionary duties are in
contrast to ministerial duties, which the Supreme Court in Mississippi
v. Johnson defined as those duties for "which nothing is left to
discretion ... a simple definite duty, imposed by law, and arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist."5 7
open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects "all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.").
52. Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. 89, 123 (1849).
53. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 916(c), pt. IV, ¶T
23c(3)(b), 34c(3) (2016) [hereinafter 2016 MCM] .
54. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annexed to
Hague Convention No. IV, art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 15 U.N.T.S. 9
[hereinafter HR TV].
55. 11 TRIALS OF WAR, supra note 46, at 1296-97.
56. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "discretionary act"
as those governed by "hard and fast rule").
57. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 498 (1867).
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As the Rendulic decision illustrates, to prove an accused was
derelict in performing a discretionary act, the government has a very
high hurdle to overcome-it must be shown that the accused could not
"justify the action by the exercise of judgment ... ."5 The Manual for
Courts-Martial articulates the standard of care similarly at Article
110, stating that "a mere error in judgement [is one] that a reasonable
person might have committed under the same circumstances. . ."5 In
the qualified immunity case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court
articulated the standard as requiring there be some "reasonable
grounds" to justify the exercise of judgment.60 In a recent case,
Mullenix v. Luna, the Supreme Court articulated the standard of care
in the negative, stating an exercise of discretion will not be lawful if
"every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates" the law.61
The Targeting Supplement refers to the standards referenced in
the previous paragraph as "abuse of discretion" standards-that for an
unintentional error to be criminal, an accused must abuse his
discretion for liability to follow. 62
IV. TARGETING, THE LAW OF WAR, AND MENS REA
A. Targeting Duties
In the modern context, the Targeting Supplement explains that
the legal duties implicated in targeting incidents, such as the MSF
incident, are discretionary, requiring application of the standard of
care articulated above.63 In the context of targeting, for example, the
Law of War imposes the following six overarching targeting duties that
may leave room for judgement in execution:
Table 1
-~ Targeting duties
Target - Attack lawful targets only.64
Identification
Specialized - Do not attack objects subject to special
Warning protection (e.g., medical units, enemy hospitals,
medical transports) unless the enemy has
misused them.65
- Provide "due warning" before attacking an
object subject to special protection66 unless
acting in self-defense.67
58. 11 TRIALS OF WAR, supra note 46, at 1297.
796 [VOL. 51:787
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Generalized - Provide advance warning before conducting
Warnings an attack where protected persons may be
harmed unless the circumstances do not
permit.68
- When warning is required, provide "effective
advance warning."69
Feasible - Take feasible measures to minimize incidental
Precautions harm.70
Principle of - Conduct proportionate attacks-the expected
Proportionality incidental harm must not be excessive in
relation to the direct and concrete military
advantage anticipated.71
Command - Take "necessary and reasonable measures" to
Responsibility prevent subordinates from unlawfully harming
59. 2016 MCM, supra note 54, pt. IV, $ 34c(3).
60. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.") (emphasis added).
61. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 U.S. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132
U.S. 2088, 2093 (2012)).
62. TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 2-3.
63. Id. at 4-5.
64. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, 1 5.63 (listing criteria for
determining if an object is a military objective); id. ¶ 5.8.3 (listing criteria for
determining if an individual is a member of an armed group); id. ¶ 5.8.3.1 (listing criteria
for determining if an individual is directly / actively participation hostilities); id. ¶ 4.3
(listing criteria for determining if an individual is a lawful combatant or unprivileged
belligerent); see also id. ¶ 5.5.2 (stating which persons and property are protected from
attack).
65. See id. T 7.10.3.3 - 1 7.10.3.6 (explaining the factors that bear upon whether
an object has lost its special protection).
66. Id. ¶ 7.10.3.2, ¶ 7.11.1 (explaining that "due warning" is required before
attacking an object subject to special protection); id. 1 5.11.5.2 (explaining what type of
advanced warning may be "effective").
67. Id. ¶ 7.10.3.2 (stating the requirement to provide warning "does not prohibit
the exercise of the right of self-defense").
68. Id. ¶ 5.11.5 (stating advance warning must be given if "circumstances
permit"); id. 1 5.11.5.2 (explaining what type of advance warning may be "effective").
69. Id. ¶ 5.11.1 - 1 5.11.1.1 (explaining that "effective warning" must be given
unless "circumstances do not permit"); id. ¶ 5.11.5.2 (explaining what type of advance
warning may be "effective").
70. Id. 1 5.2.3 (articulating the general rule that feasible precautions must be
taken); id. ¶ 5.11.3 (explaining that adjusting the timing of an attack is a form of
precaution); id. 1 5.11.6 (explaining that selecting the weaponering for an attack is a
form of precaution); id. ¶ 5.2.3.2. (listing factors that bear on what precautions are
feasible).
71. Id. ¶ 5.12 (explaining pertinent factual considerations to be assessed in
determine whether an attack would be proportionate).
2018] 97
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persons and property protected by the Law of
War.72
B. Information Assessment Duties
In addition to the targeting duties referenced in Table 1 above, the
Targeting Supplement also specifies that for each targeting duty the
Law of War imposes a corresponding "information assessment duty."73
Like the targeting duties listed above at Table 1, the Targeting
Supplement explains that the information assessment duties, too, are
discretionary in nature, and they are as follows:
Table 2
72. Id. ¶ 18.23.3; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE, CHANGE No. 11976,178-79 (July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10] ("The
commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge,
through reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons
subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to
take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to
punish violators thereof.") (emphasis added).
73. TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 2-3.
Thfornmation Assesmnt D t
Target - Take reasonable steps to identify a person or
Identification object as a legal target.
Specialized - Exercise due regard in determining whether an
Warning object subject to special protection lost its
protected status under the Law of War.
- Take reasonable steps to determine what means
of communicating the warning would be
adequate.
Generalized - Take reasonable steps to determine whether the
Warnings circumstances permit providing an advanced
warning.
-Take reasonable steps to determine what means
of communicating the warning would be
adequate.
Feasible - Take reasonable steps to determine what
Precautions precautionary measures are feasible.
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Principle of - Take reasonable steps to determine whether the
Proportionality incidental harm would be excessive in relation to
the direct and concrete military advantage
anticipated.
Command - Take reasonable steps to monitor subordinate
Responsibility compliance with the Law of War.
7 4
C. Mens Rea
Thus, given the discretionary nature of the duties articulated in
Table 1 and Table 2, the following excerpt bearing on mens rea from
the qualified immunity case of Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd applies equally in
the context of combatant immunity regarding targeting decisions:
"Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgements about open legal questions.
When properly applied, it protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law."'75 As such, prosecutions for law
violations in the context of targeting will be extremely rare occurrences
because absent specific intent, a prosecutor must establish plain
incompetence or an abuse of discretion. Mere harm to persons or
property protected by the Law of War is not enough.
Therefore the Targeting Supplement contains both a subjective
standard and an objective standard in order to assess whether an
accused violated a duty listed in Table 1 and Table 2 in causing such
harm. Regarding the subjective standard, if the individual specifically
intended to violate any of the duties listed in Table 1 and Table 2, the
Targeting Supplement explains that would be a violation of the Law of
War.7 6 Regarding the objective standard, if the accused commits an
unintentional error amounting to plain incompetence or an abuse of
discretion, liability would hinge upon whether that individual was also
culpably negligent when viewed from "the conditions as they appeared
to the defendant at the time."7 7
D. Competent Authority Required
It is important to note that not all service members engaged in
targeting decisions are subject to the Law of War targeting obligations.
The Targeting Supplement explains that a determination of whether a
74. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 18.23.3 n.338 (citing FM 27-10,
supra note 72, at 178-79).
75. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244-45 (2012).
76. TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 6.
77. Id. at 4-5; 11 TRIALS OF WAR, supra note 46, at 1297.
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service member is bound by a particular targeting duty depends "upon
whether he or she has the authority to exercise the discretion implied
by the targeting duty in question."7 8 For example, command
responsibility will not attach unless that soldier exercises command
discretion.7 9 Accordingly, he or she generally must be a commander.
Similarly, the duty to conduct proportionate attacks will "normally"
occur if that soldier "has authority over military operations."80 This is
important because "[l]ower level personnel may not be privy to the
strategic or operational significance of a specific attack, and thus may
not be competent to evaluate the expected military advantage of the
attack against the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects."81
With respect to feasible precautions, the duty generally attaches if the
soldier has the "authority to direct and manage resources (e.g.,
allocating weapon systems and intelligence assets) or judgments about
the acceptable degree of risk (e.g., to the lives of friendly forces and to
mission accomplishment)."82
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR
The Targeting Supplement also addresses the relationship
between violations of duties grounded in domestic law and violations
of duties grounded in the Law of War. In particular it states in
pertinent part:
[R]ules of engagement, standing operating procedures, and other sources of duty
may impose greater restrictions than the requirements of the Law of War.
Depending on the circumstances, a failure to comply with such standards could
be a violation of the UCMJ, and yet not be a violation of the Law of War.83
Yet, a violation of a domestic legal obligation in some
circumstances may also result in a Law of War violation, even if the
obligation itself is not imposed by the Law of War. A Nuremberg
Tribunal, in the so-called Hostage Case, determined that if a
commander was derelict in his duty to review reports sent to his
headquarters "for his special benefit," even if the reports are not
mandated by the Law of War, that dereliction may prevent him from
asserting his resulting ignorance as a defense to an alleged Law of War
violation.84 Underpinning the tribunal's reasoning was that a basic





83. Id. at 3-4.
84. 11 TRIALS OF WAR, supra note 46, at 1271 ("Want of knowledge of the
contents of reports made to him is not a defense. Reports to commanding generals are
made for their special benefit. Any failure to acquaint themselves with the contents of
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function of any commander is to read reports that his or her
subordinates provide him-failing to do so is a violation of his or her
domestic legal military responsibilities, a dereliction that cannot be
used to support a defense of ignorance.85
The reasoning applied in the Hostage Case can also be applied
outside the command responsibility context. For example, in combat, a
standard operating procedure might require the warfighter to check a
"no-strike list" before authorizing an airstrike on a suspected
target.86 If the warfighter was derelict in his or her duty to check the
no-strike list and struck a protected object on the list, that dereliction
may prevent the warfighter from asserting his or her resulting
ignorance of the target's actual protected status under the Law of War
as a defense to an alleged Law of War violation.87
Turning to the MSF airstrike, there was a no-strike list, and the
AR 15-6 investigation determined that the hospital was placed on that
list.8 8 However, the no-strike list was not uploaded to the AC-130's
computer system, so the flight crew was unaware of the protected
status of the hospital.89 The investigation failed to address whether a
member of the flight crew, or a commander, had a legal duty under the
UCMJ to manually check the no-strike list.9 0 As such, the investigation
did not address whether US domestic law imposed a duty upon any
member of the flight crew or a commander to check the list, a
dereliction that may have resulted in a Law of War violation.
such reports . . . constitutes a dereliction of duty which he cannot use in his own behalf.")
(emphasis added).
85. See id.
86. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60, at 11-12 (Jan. 13, 2013)
("No-strike entities are protected from the effects of military operations under
international law and/or the ROE. Attacking these may violate the laws of war (e.g.,
cultural and religious sites, embassies belonging to noncombatant countries, hospitals,
schools) or interfere with friendly relations with other nations, indigenous populations,
or governments. [No Strike Lists (NSLs)] are not target lists, since the entities on the
NSLs are not targets. NSLs are continuously updated with the latest information from
the operational environment.").
87. U.S. GovT PRINTING OFFICE, 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1055 (1950) ("Mummenthey's assertions that he did
not know what was happening in the labor camps and enterprises under his jurisdiction
does not exonerate him. It was his duty to know."); U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, 14
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1088 (1950)
("It was his duty as the head to inquire into the treatment accorded to the foreign
workers and to the prisoners of war whose employment in his war plants was . . .
forbidden by the rules of warfare.. ."); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES'
BENCHBOOK T 5-11-2 n.1 (Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter JBB] ("The (ignorance) (mistake)
cannot be based on a . . . failure to discover the true facts.").
88. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 3; KUNDUZ
INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 80.
89 KUNDUZ INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 80.
90. Id. at 80-81.
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The Targeting Supplement specifically addresses the application
of the ignorance-of-fact defense to the Law of War to such an occurrence
in the future.9 ' In particular, it makes clear that an intentional
dereliction or a culpably negligent dereliction of duty may result in the
denial of the ignorance-of-fact defense in the context of alleged
violations of the Law of War.92
VI. THE LAW OF WAR AND THE UCMJ
A. Public Authority Justification and the Law of War
The public authority justification is the key to understanding how
a Law of War violation may result in a violation of crimes contained in
the UCMJ, such as assault, murder, or manslaughter.9 3 The UCMJ's
public authority justification is referenced in the Targeting
Supplement, which states that "[a] death, injury, or other act caused or
done in the performance of duty and in compliance with the Law of War
is justified and not unlawful with respect to that body of Law."94
How the public authority justification is applied in the context of
the Law of War is explained by a 2010 Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum.95 This memorandum addressed
whether Department of Defense (DoD) officials could be subject to
prosecution for conducting a contemplated drone strike against a US
citizen who was an enemy combatant located in Yemen.96 18 U.S.C.
§ 1119(b) criminalizes the killing of a US national while within the
jurisdiction of another country.9 7 Despite this prohibition, the OLC
ultimately concluded that "the statute should be read to exclude from
its prohibitory scope killings that are encompassed by traditional
justifications, which include the public authority justification."9 8
In reaching its conclusion, the OLC noted there is a dearth of
precedent addressing the contours of the public authority
91. TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 7.
92. Id.
93. See 2016 MCM, supra note 53, at 11-116 ("A death, injury, or other act caused
or done in the proper performance of a legal duty is justified and not unlawful."); Id. at
Discussion ("killing an enemy combatant in battle is justified"); cf. Model Penal Code §
3.03(2)(b) (1985) (proposing that criminal statutes recognize justification for a killing
pursuant to a "public duty" that "occurs in the lawful conduct of war"); see also United
States v. Payne, 40 C.M.R. 516, 519 (A.C.M.R. 1969) (stating that a legal duty may be
imposed by "the law of war, written and customary").
94. TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 3-4.
95. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Att'y Gen., Applicability of Federal Criminal
Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar
al-Aulaqi 12 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter OLC Memo].
96. Id. at 21.
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id. at 17.
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justification." The OLC also noted there is no federal statute that
explicitly establishes a public authority justification defense.00
Nonetheless, it determined that § 1119(b) contemplated a public
authority justification because its legislative history contemplated that
only "unlawful" killings could be prosecuted'0 1-the same terminology
used in the UCMJ's punitive articles.1 02
The OLC then went on to cite the Laws of War as a specific subset
of the public authority justification. 0 3 In particular, the memorandum
stated: "[w]e conclude that the [public authority] justification would be
available because the operation would constitute the lawful conduct of
war-a well-established variant of the public authority
justification."1 04 It is also noteworthy that the OLC relied upon DoD
interpretations of the Law of War and US treaty obligations as
informing the contours of the public authority immunity for the DoD
personnel at issue.10 5
The Targeting Supplement therefore should be understood as
taking the same approach to applying the Law of War under the UCMJ
that the OLC took to applying the Law of War under federal statute.
That is, it relies upon DoD interpretations of the Law of War and US
treaty obligations as informing the contours of the combatant
immunity in the context of targeting. When service members are
"plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law,"'0 6 they lose
their protection from prosecution for the common law-like crimes
contained in the UCMJ's punitive articles. As the Targeting
99. Id. at 15.
100. See id. at 17.
101. See id. at 12-14.
102. See, e.g., UCMJ, supra note 13, art. 118 (premeditated murder).
103. See OLC Memo, supra note 95, at 20.
104. Id.
105. See id. ("Although DoD would specifically target al-Aulaqi, and would do so
without advance warning, such characteristics of the contemplated operation would not
violate the laws of war and, in particular, would not cause the operation to violate the
prohibitions on treachery and perfidy-which are addressed to conduct involving a breach
of confidence by the assailant."); see, e.g., Hague Convention IV, Annex, art. 23(b), 36
Stat. at 2301-02 ("[It is especially forbidden ... to kill or wound treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army"); cf. Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 37(1) (prohibiting the killing, injuring or capture of
an adversary in an international armed conflict by resort to acts "inviting the confidence
of [the] adversary . .. with intent to betray that confidence," including feigning a desire
to negotiate under truce or flag of surrender; feigning incapacitation; and feigning
noncombatant status). Those prohibitions do not categorically preclude the use of stealth
or surprise in conducting an attack against individual soldiers or officers. See U.S. ARMY
FIELD MANUAL 27-10, ¶ 31 (1956) (article 23(b) of the Annex to the Hague Convention
IV does not "preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in
the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or else-where, and we are not aware of any
other law-of-war grounds precluding the use of such tactics.").
106. TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 4 n.26.
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Supplement explains, for those who violate Law of War targeting
obligations, those crimes could include: attempts, conspiracy, murder,
involuntary manslaughter, assault, and so forth.1 07
B. Grave Breaches of the Law of War
While every violation of the Law of War may be punishable under
the UCMJ, not every violation will amount to a grave breach of the
Law of War. However, it would be inaccurate to say, as was asserted
by US Central Command (CENTCOM) in the aftermath of the MSF
incident, that the"[t]he label 'war crimes'". applies only to "intentional
acts-intentionally targeting civilians or intentionally targeting
protected objects."10 8 Rather, for the United States, even "grave
breaches" of the Law of War-those defined in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions10 9-can result from culpable negligence.110 In particular,
the Targeting Supplement makes this clear in articulating the
following grave breaches defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions as
being potentially implicated in the targeting context:
* "[Wilful killing" of protected persons;
* "[W]ilfully . . . causing serious injury to body or
health" to protected persons;
* 'Willful harm to protected property provided
damage thereto is 'extensive'; and
* "Culpably negligent harm to protected property..
. provided the harm was the product of the 'wanton'
form of culpable negligence, and the damage caused
was 'extensive."'i
Although CENTCOM's assertion on this matter was inaccurate,
the CENTCOM report was partially correct in the context of the
conflict in Afghanistan. To understand this point, it is first necessary
to understand that conflict in Afghanistan is generally recognized as a
Common Article 3 conflict, also known as a non-international armed
conflict (NIAC). 112 Because Common Article 3 does not define any
107. See id. at 7-8.
108. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 2.
109. See GC, supra note 12; GC II, supra note 12; GC III, supra note 12; GC IV,
supra note 12.
110. See TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 10.
111. Id. at 9-10.
112. See White House, Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the
United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations 15 (Dec.
2016) ("As a matter of international law, the United States initiated counterterrorism
combat operations in Afghanistan in U.S. national self-defense. On October 7, 2001, the
United States notified the U.N. Security Council consistent with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter that the United States was taking action in the exercise of its right of self-
defense in response to the September 11th attacks. Seventy-two U.S. military operations
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grave breaches in an NIAC, a plain reading of this article would lead
one to conclude that none of the grave breaches listed in the previous
paragraph apply to the MSF incident, willful or otherwise.113 However,
the United States has taken the position that the offenses listed in
Common Article 3 can amount to a grave breach in an NIAC to the
extent those offenses are also referenced in the grave breach provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.114 As such, in the context of targeting,
the grave breaches related to willfully harming protected persons meet
this criteria.1 5 By contrast, the grave breach provision related to
intentional or culpably negligent harm to protected property cannot
apply in an NIAC, because this provision has no analog in Common
Article 3.116
Therefore, the CENTCOM statement is accurate as it applies to
Afghanistan to the extent it states that "[t]he label 'war crimes"'
applies only to "intentional acts-intentionally targeting
civilians . . ."117 Further, as there was no evidence of intentional harm
to protected persons in the MSF incident, no "grave breach" of the Law
of War occurred in that circumstance.118 Nonetheless, the CENTCOM
statement indicated there was a lack of understanding that
unintentional acts could amount to a grave breach, and this resulted
in justifiable criticism that called into question the validity of various
findings." 9 Therefore, the Targeting Supplement specifically
addresses how targeting law violations may amount to grave breaches
in NIAC or otherwise to provide clarity to judge advocates in the
future. 120
and support for Afghan military forces in the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan are
now undertaken consistent with the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United
States and Afghanistan and with the consent of the Government of Afghanistan.").
113. See, e.g., GC I, supra note 12, art. 3'(this article is common to all four Geneva
Conventions).
114. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, ¶ 18.9.3.2 ("Since Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Convention protects persons against some of the acts described as
grave breaches, the United States took the position that the obligations created by the
grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions could also apply to violations
of Common Article '3.").
115. Compare GC IV, supra note 12, art. 147 (classifying as a grave breach "willful
killing" and "willfully ... causing serious injury to body or health . . ."), with id. art. 3
(prohibiting in pertinent part "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds. . .").
116. Compare GC IV, supra note 12, art. 147 (classifying as a grave breach
"extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly."), with id. art. 3 (not articulating the causing of harm to
property as a violation of CA3.).
117. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 2.
118 See id.; TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 10.
119. See U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SUMMARY, supra note 23.
120. See TARGETING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 10.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The American people and US partners and allies expect and will
continue to demand that US armed forces adhere to the law applicable
to the battlefield. When credible allegations of violations of the Law
of War are received, the allegations must be fairly and impartially
investigated. Adherence to the law must be clearly demonstrated in
investigative reports and processes in order to safeguard the legitimacy
of US operations. The MSF incident was a wake-up call for the DoD;
one that brought to light serious gaps in understanding about the
interrelation between the Law of War, the UCMJ, and the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. The Targeting Supplement addresses those gaps,
integrates lessons learned, and solidifies the foundation upon which
the United States can continue to influence and develop the Law of
War.
